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Is the rapid growth of China’s emerging industries driven by industrial subsidies?: People’s Daily_我的网站

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Workers assemble solar photovoltaic modules at a smart manufacturing workshop of Ronma Solar Energy Group in Jindong district of Jinhua city, East China's Zhejiang Province, on July 28, 2026. Photo: VCG
China saw robust exports in electric vehicles (EV), lithium batteries and photovoltaic products, known as the "new three," in the first half of this year. More notably, robotics, artificial intelligence (AI) and innovative drugs, which represent the future direction of industrial development, are also emerging as new calling cards for China's foreign trade.
However, the impressive performance provoked unease among some Western media outlets and politicians. Some have deliberately portrayed China's rapid industrial development and strong competitiveness as a result of government subsidies, pushing the false claim that subsidies have created overcapacity and those low-priced Chinese products are flooding global markets. Such fallacies, which simply equate industrial subsidies with overcapacity, are not only logically flawed but also factually groundless.
In practice, many countries adopt industrial policies tailored to their national conditions and development needs, such as providing research and development (R&D) subsidies for emerging industries and risk related subsidies for agriculture.
Well-designed industrial subsidies can help address market failures, promote technological innovation and environmental protection, reduce poverty and support balanced development, rather than cause so called "overcapacity."
Multiple reports by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development have noted that the number of industrial policies worldwide has grown rapidly over the past five years, with R&D subsidies, tax incentives and low interest loans for emerging industries becoming common international practices.
Forcibly linking industrial subsidies to "overcapacity" is, in essence, a political manipulation based on double standards. The US, for example, plans to provide $750 billion in various subsidies from 2022 to 2031 under its Inflation Reduction Act. Subsidized EVs are subject to requirements such as production and sales in the US or North America, effectively excluding other WTO members. US industrial subsidies for AI are even greater than those of all other countries combined.
Similarly, according to incomplete statistics, the European Commission is expected to provide more than 1.44 trillion euros ($210 billion) in various subsidies between 2021 and 2030. The EU's Industrial Accelerator Act links local content directly to financial support through "Made in EU" requirements, creating serious investment barriers and institutional discrimination.
Have these massive subsidies been labeled as causing "overcapacity"? The answer is no. While claiming that China's industrial subsidies lead to so-called overcapacity, these countries are themselves providing massive subsidies to their own industries. Such double standards amount to selective accusations targeting China, aimed at politicizing trade and economic issues and weaponizing industrial policy.
At a deeper level, accusations that "China's industrial subsidies cause overcapacity" are merely a pretext, reflecting growing anxiety and fear over the rising competitiveness of Chinese industries.
Looking back at the repeated hype in Western media, the criticism has consistently targeted China's most globally competitive industries, including new-energy vehicles, photovoltaics and power batteries. This exposes the real intention of shifting the blame for their own lagging industrial development onto China while stepping up restrictions against Chinese industries.
China's breakthroughs in these industries have been driven by advances in homegrown technologies, complete industrial and supply chains, and robust market competition, rather than by policy subsidies as some have claimed.
In recent years, China has taken multiple steps to regulate and improve its subsidy policies, from reviewing and correcting inappropriate local subsidies to exploring a unified negative list mechanism for local fiscal subsidies. China applies subsidies equally to all market entities, including foreign invested enterprises, strictly follows WTO rules, and continues to improve the compliance, effectiveness and transparency of its subsidy policies.
Rather than fabricating and hyping baseless claims about subsidies and obsessing over building trade barriers, certain Western media outlets and politicians should focus on addressing their own weaknesses and increasing investment in research and development. They should embrace healthy market competition with an inclusive mindset, promote mutual benefit through greater openness, and win markets and drive progress through genuine innovation.
This was compiled and translated by the Global Times English edition based on an article published in the "Chisu Jinsheng" economic commentary column of the People's Daily on August 10, 2026.
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